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Introduction
The markets for venture capital (VC) and initial public offerings (IPOs) are usually
closely linked because the going public of a firm offers an important exit opportunity for early
investors. This applies especially for hot issue markets, i.e., periods in which equity prices are
extraordinary high and the number of IPOs increases dramatically (Lemer, 1994). Thus, the
opening of a new stock market segment for high tech growth firms at the German Stock Ex
change in 1997 - called Neuer Markt - offered venture capitalists the opportunity for more effi
cient and profitable exit strategies. This new market segment also set off a strong increase in
venture capital financing for start-up firms in Germany. The year 1997 was also the beginning
of a period of dramatically increasing stock prices world wide and particularly in the German
Neuer Markt with index returns of up to 1,600% from March 1997 to March 2000 as measured
by the Nemax {Neuer Markt Index). In fact, the Neuer Markt with its 329 listings became the
most successful market for growth firms in Europe during that period. Unfortunately, due to an
extremely poor performance of minus 96% of the Nemax from its peak in March 2000 and
many scandals and bankruptcies, it was eventually closed as a market segment in March 2003.
Of the 329 IPOs, 297 are now listed in the Prime Standard or General Standard segment of the
German Stock Exchange, 18 were acquired, and 14 failed. Thus, an analysis of the Neuer Markt
offers a great opportunity to analyze whether venture-backed IPOs are more successful than
non venture-backed IPOs and whether venture capitalists are able to time their exit well. This
latter aspect is especially interesting because the investors in the Neuer Markt were constrained
by mandatory lock-up periods of six months.
The objective of venture capitalists usually consists of investing in promising private
companies at attractive prices and selling them at much higher prices. One sensible exit route
for successful ventures is going public and selling shares either in the primary or secondary
market. Hot issue markets usually provide an ideal setting for such an exit. Gompers and Lemer
(2003) find that realized VC returns are typically above average in hot issue markets and below
average in cold issue markets. Because the underpricing of IPOs is particularly high in hot issue
markets, it seems sensible for the VC not to exit at the time of the IPO but to sell the shares in
the secondary market. However, if the lock-up period expires after the stock market has peaked,
the venture capitalist may loose the opportunity for an optimal exit. In fact, the time window
for exit at relatively high prices was very limited in the Neuer Markt and lasted only several
months. Moreover, there was a time gap of six months between the going public and the exit.
The objective of this study is to investigate the exit behavior of venture capitalists in Germany.
In particular, we analyze whether VCs were able to exploit these ideal exit opportunities by
selling shares either at the time of the IPO or in the secondary market at higher prices. In addi
tion, we investigate for those IPOs that went public at the peak of the market whether the VC
missed the optimal exit point and is still invested in the IPO. We find empirical evidence that
VCs were able to time their exit quite successfully in the primary market and to some extent
also in the secondary market. Obviously, those firms that went public in the year 2000 planned
their IPO too late in the stock market cycle so that - due to the mandatory lock-up period of six
months - some VCs had no chance for a lucrative exit. Some venture capitalists still owned
shares even three years after the IPO. Thus, lock-up commitments can be quite costly for early
investors in particular towards the end of a hot issue market.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section the markets for venture
capital and initial public offerings in Germany are described. The literature is reviewed in sec

19
tion II and the optimal timing for an IPO and for a venture capital exit is discussed in section
III. The data and methodology are described in section IV. The empirical findings are presented
in section V in the following order. First we compare the performance of venture-backed and
non venture-backed IPOs and then analyze the VC exit behavior in the primary market, the
impact with respect to the lock-up commitment, and the exit behavior in the secondary market.
Then we extend our empirical analysis by including some additional variables to check for the
robustness of our previous results with cross sectional regressions. Finally we analyze the buyand-hold returns for IPOs during the hot issue periods of 1999 and 2000. This study ends with a
summary and conclusions.
I.

Venture Capital and Initial Public Offerings in Germany
In most economies venture capital and IPO markets are interdependent (Black and Gil
son, 1998). This is also the case in Germany. In the following sections we analyze the German
markets for venture capital and for initial public offerings.
A.
Venture Capital
The market for venture capital was not well established in Germany for a long period of
time and is still not at a level that would be required to provide sufficient funds for start-up
firms, given the size of the German economy. In the early 1980s, the total VC volume invested
by members of the German Venture Capital Association (BVK), the German umbrella organi
zation for venture capitalists, hardly exceeded an amount of one billion Euros. In the 1990s,
however, the VC volume started to increase impressively. The amount of venture capital pro
vided by members of the BVK for the period from 1983 to 2003 is documented in Figure I.
Within this period VC volume increased from € 0.4 billion to € 39.9 billion. This amounts to an
average annual growth rate of close to 30%. Obviously, this strong growth rate is the result of
the global boom in technology stocks in the late 1990s and the opening of the Neuer Markt in
1997.
Despite the immense growth rate, the German VC market may still be considered un
derdeveloped by international standards. In 2002, the total volume of new venture capital in
vestments in the United States was $ 62.7 billion which amounts to 0.60% of U.S. GDP. In the
United Kingdom, venture capitalists invested $ 9.6 billion or about 0.62% of U.K. GDP. Even
in France new venture investments exceeded $ 5.5 billion or about 0.39% of GDP in 2002. In
contrast, venture capital investments in Germany amounted only to about $ 2.4 billion or 0.21%
of GDP in 2002 (for detailed data see PWC/3i, 2003). Thus, these figures support the view of
an underdeveloped VC market in Germany. The volume of invested funds will have to improve
substantially in the future in order to provide sufficient risk capital so that start-up firms with
promising prospects can be financed.
Additional insights into the current structure of the German VC market may be gained
by analyzing the different sources of venture financing as well as the various exit routes used in
recent years. Table la shows the sources of new VC funds for the period 1997 to 2000. Over
that period the volume more than doubled from € 2,186 million to € 5,803 million. Neverthe
less, due to the German universal banking system, financial institutions supplied a substantial
fraction of VC investments. In fact, in 1997 banks provided 58% of the new venture capital.
However, the relative involvement of banks has decreased continuously over recent years. In
2000, banks contributed about the same amount in absolute terms but only 29% of total new
funds. This decrease reflects the shift to other sources of VC financing. While insurance com
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panies’ proportion of VC volume increased from 10% to 17% from 1997-2000, the amount
invested more than quadrupled. Interestingly, since the year 2000 pension funds also began
increasing their supply of to d s for venture capital financing in Germany. Such behaviour is
usually the case in market based financial systems, hi addition, the share of the public sector
increased from 5% to 16%.
Obviously, the willingness to provide venture capital fiinds is related to the opportunity
to exit from the venture at favorable terms later on. In principle, the VC has the following alter
natives to exit: trade sale, management buy back, initial public offering or secondary purchase.
The investment is written off if the venture fails. Table Ib shows the importance of various exit
routes for German VCs for the period surrounding the Neuer Markt from 1997 to 2003. During
this period the volume increased from € 728 million to € 2,132 million in 2002 but declined to
€ 820 million in 2003. Over this period VCs sold about 30% of their investments by trade sale.
Buy backs by initial shareholders or management fluctuated between 3.7% in 2002 and 30% in
1998. Up to 14% of VC exits were realized by secondary purchases (2003). IPOs became popu
lar during the time of very favorable exit conditions between 1998 and 2000. During this pe
riod, VCs sold up to 14% (1998) of their equity stake by bringing the company to the stock
market. Beginning in 2001 and triggered by the decline in stock prices, IPOs were no longer a
viable exit option resulting in not a single IPO in Germany in 2003 (Figure II). Instead, many
ventures failed and write-offs became the most common exit route with about 40% annually
between 2001 and 2003. Thus, the Neuer Markt apparently provided the venture capitalists with
great exit opportunities at least for some time.
B.
Initial Public Offerings in the Neuer Markt
Historically, the German financial markets were relatively small and did not offer great
opportunities for firms to go public. The number of IPOs for the period from 1977 to 2003 is
shown in Figure II. In the late 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, less than 10 firms went
public each year. Over the period from 1983 to 1997 the annual number of new listings was
between 9 and 33. Given the size of the German economy this is still a very small number.
With the technology boom in the late 1990s, IPOs suddenly became tremendously popular even
in Germany. In 1998, 71 firms went public and in the following two years this number in
creased to 166 (1999) and 160 (2000) IPOs. This period can clearly be labeled as a hot issue
market. Due to the substantial decline in the stock price levels since March 2000 the IPO activ
ity slowed dramatically and came to a standstill in 2003. In 2001 only 26 and in 2002 merely 7
firms went public in Germany. In 2003, there was not even one IPO. Some firms went public in
2004, but many announced IPOs were eventually withdrawn. Thus, the IPO market in Germany
is currently in a very difficult position which may be due to the negative performance of the
previous years, scandals, bankruptcies, and the closing of the Neuer Markt in 2003.
From an institutional perspective the increase in IPO activity in Germany was strongly
supported by the opening of the Neuer Markt which was established as a special market seg
ment for small and young growth firms in 1997. The previous attempt in 1989 to establish a
similar market segment was less successful (Schmidt and Schrader, 1993). To signal the high
standards of this new market segment, firms had to comply with several very special listing
requirements of the Neuer Markt. In this form they were novel. First of all, IPOs were forced to
raise substantial new equity capital as at least half of the issuing volume had to consist of pri
mary shares. The reason for this requirement was that the exchange thought that growth firms
always need additional equity capital. Furthermore, IPOs were forced to use the sometimes
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substantial cash inflow from the IPO to finance growth. Debt repayment was not an option al
lowed for these firms. Moreover, additional equity capital could not be issued during the first
six months. Thus, all required funds had to be raised at the time of the IPO, resulting in the
usual agency and moral hazard problems (Bessler and Kurth, 2004). Most important - and of
special interest for this study - initial shareholders had to commit to a mandatory lock-up period
of at least six months. Such requirements were also used in other markets such as the U.S. and
the U.K., but in those markets they were based on a voluntary contract between the underwriter
and the firm. The basic idea of lock-up agreements is to signal the quality of the firm as well as
the commitment of the founders, venture capitalists, and management not to exit the venture
immediately after the IPO. This requirement was non-negotiable for all shares retained by ini
tial shareholders. Thus, initial shareholders could either sell shares in the primary market or in
the secondary market after six months of trading. Again, this created certain agency problems
and opportunistic behavior by venture capitalists, banks, undervsriters, and analysts (Bessler
and Kurth, 2005). However, after the lock-up period, large equity stakes could be sold unno
ticed by initial shareholders or management because there were no disclosure requirements.
Bessler et al. (2003) even argue that this special legal environment of the German Stock Ex
change, which was based on private law not public law, may have contributed significantly to
the problems and failure of the Neuer Markt. Moreover, and very interestingly, there are special
tax laws in Germany for the treatment of capital gains. Although this was not an important
regulation for institutional investors, the private investor was locked-in by tax laws in that capi
tal gains were not taxable after a holding period of 6 months until the end of 1998. This period
was extended to 12 months at the beginning of 1999. Thus, a very special legal environment
influenced the exit behavior of private and institutional investors in the German Neuer Markt.
This behavior v^th respect to lock-up periods and tax laws resulted in significant stock price
reactions.
The Neuer Markt is a perfect reflection of the rise and fall of the German IPO market.
As presented in Figure III, the Nemax Allshare Index rose from about 500 in March 1997 to
8,583 in March 2000. Thus, within three years, the index increased by about 1,600%. Many
firms exploited this “window of opportunity” in a hot issue market and listed either in 1999 or
in 2000. More than 80% of all German initial public offerings in the Neuer Markt occurred
v^thin that period. Thus, on average more firms went public within a month during that period
than v^thin one year in the 1980s. However, the decline of the index from its peak of 8,583 in
March 2000 to a level of 353 on October 8 , 2002, a decline of 96%, was dramatic. Thus, the
Deutsche Boerse AG finally closed the Neuer Markt segment in 2003 in response to this de
cline, but also due to several company scandals and legal problems (Bessler and Kurth, 2003).
In sum, the attempt to overcome the traditional bank based financial system and to create a suc
cessful stock market segment in particular for innovative grow1;h firms was clearly not a long
term success. Nevertheless, the hot issue market of 1999 and 2000 was unique for the German
stock market. Especially for growth firms it provided a great “window of opportunity” to issue
new equity at relatively high prices. This was also a great opportunity for venture capitalist to
sell their equity stakes either in the primary or secondary market at relatively high prices. How
ever, for both the timing was essential.
II.

Literature Review
The importance of venture capital has been well documented in the academic literature
in that an efficient venture capital market is important in providing risk capital for start-up
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firms, thereby reducing the financing problems for risky ventures and stimulating economic
growth (Gompers and Lemer, 1999a). Hence, supporting venture capital firms has become a
pivotal element on the political agenda in some countries. Recently, France increased the per
centage that insurance companies can invest as venture capital (Handelsblatt, September 8,
2004, p. 19). The main reason for such a support is that first of all venture capitalists perform
important functions during the start-up phase of a company such as screening and consulting
(Berlin, 1998). They further increase the success rate by closely monitoring and enforcing in
centive compatible contracts (bonding) so that management is motivated to maximize the mar
ket value of the venture (Gompers and Lemer, 1999a).
If venture capitalists do have a significantly positive influence on the success and per
formance of start-up firms, this should be observable initially at the time of the initial public
offering and then in a superior long-run performance of the IPO. Because some venture capital
ists more often use initial public offerings as an exit route than trade sales or share buy backs,
one would expect that the VC is sensitive to any negative reputation effects that may be caused
by an underperforming IPO or by any inappropriate exit behavior. Consequently, reasonable
offer prices and prudent exit behavior can be generally expected. If this is the case, venture
capitalists should be in a position to signal the quality and value of an IPO, thereby reducing
the adverse selection problems (certification hypothesis). Hence, venture-backed IPOs should
have a lower underpricing and a superior long-run performance compared to non venturebacked IPOs. In contrast, it seems quite realistic to assume that venture capitalists possess pri
vate information and will seek an optimal exit either in the primary or secondary market in or
der to maximize their own return on investment. Thus, it may not be surprising that VCs possi
bly will exploit privileged information to the disadvantage of investors either in the primary or
secondary market.
So far the empirical evidence on these issues is mixed. Megginson and Weiss (1991),
for example, find for U.S. venture-backed IPOs on average a lower underpricing. In contrast,
Barry et al. (1990) observe a lower underpricing only when experienced VCs are involved. In
contrast, Francis and Hasan (2001), Smart and Zutter (2003) as well as Lee and Wahal (2004)
find opposite results in that they document even higher initial returns for venture-backed IPOs.
Brav and Gompers (1997), who investigate long-run performance, find superior returns for venture-backed IPOs. A special exit timing ability of VCs is also reported by Lemer (1994). This
latter result is confirmed by Gompers and Lemer (1998) who observe that venture-backed IPOs
significantly outperform before the exit of the venture capitalist and significantly imderperform
thereafter. In a more recent line of research. Field and Hanka (2001) provide evidence that VCs
sell a substantial percentage of their shareholdings immediately after the lock-up period ex
pires, thus making the end of the lock-up period an important valuation event. In addition, Brav
and Gompers (2003) find extended lock-up periods for those IPOs that may have some severe
agency problems. This suggests that lock-up commitments in general as well as the length of
the lock-up period may be used as a positive signaling device.
Nevertheless, the primary objective of venture capital firms is to eam a superior risk
adjusted return for their investors. This means an initial investment in a promising venture at a
relatively low price and an exit at a relatively high price. Venture capitalists might be in a posi
tion to influence both. Depending on the venture, the expected retums of a successful invest
ment is close to 60% annually (Berlin, 1998). Gompers und Lemer (2003) also document for
the U.S. annual retums of more than 50% during boom markets. However, in a weak market
environment such as that at the end of the technology bubble in 2001, this can change into
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negative returns. This raises the question of an optimal point in time for exit. The two most
prominent dates are either at the time of the IPO or after the expiration of the lock-up period. In
the U.S. venture capitalists usually do not sell a large percentage of their stake at the time of the
IPO, but often continue to play an active role in the company, for example, on the board of di
rectors (Barry et al., 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Lin and Smith, 1998).
For Germany the long-run performance of IPOs was investigated by Bessler and Thies
(2004) for the period fi'om 1970 to 1995, which is a period before the opening of the Neuer
Markt. They find the usual long-run underperformance (36 months) with the exception that
IPOs with subsequent season equity offerings (SSEO) outperformed the market significantly.
Bessler et al. (1998) also examine IPOs’ operating as well as stock market performance in
Germany for the same period. They find some evidence that corporate governance issues, i.e.,
the German universal banking system, may influence both the firms’ decisions to go public and
their performance in the secondary market. For the Neuer Markt in Germany, a number of stud
ies investigated the impact of venture capitalists on the underpricing of IPOs, but do not find a
significant difference between venture-backed and non venture-backed IPOs. Surprisingly,
there seems to be a positive relationship between the reputation of the VC and underpricing,
meaning that IPOs backed by reputable VCs are more underpriced (Franzke, 2001; Tykvova
and Walz, 2004). Despite these findings, venture capitalists in Germany appear to sell more
shares at the time of the IPO than their U.S. counterparts (Bessler and Kurth, 2004). Moreover,
there is some empirical evidence that venture-backed IPOs are significantly more underpriced
when the VC is either a member of the underwriting syndicate or a subsidiary of a bank
(Bessler and Kurth, 2005). Obviously, there are severe conflicts of interest between VC financ
ing, IPO underwriting and commercial banking. Empirical evidence for these problematic rela
tionships is also provided in a study by Ber et al. (2001) for Israel.
There are only a few studies that investigate the long-run performance of venturebacked IPOs in the German Neuer Markt. The findings are generally an underperformance rela
tive to other IPOs after 3 years. One frequently given explanation for these results is the inexpe
rience of German venture capital firms (Rindermann, 2004; Tykvova and Walz, 2004). In con
trast, Bessler and Kurth (2005) find strong indications that VCs and especially bank-affiliated
VCs time their exit quite well in the primary as well as in the secondary market. When bankaffiliated VCs sell a major part of their shares at the time of the IPO, these firms underperform
significantly in the secondary market. The opposite is generally true if bank-affiliated VCs keep
their shares. It is very interesting to observe that there is a strong superior performance in the
first six months of trading, but a tremendous decline in abnormal returns (BHAR) later on. Ob
viously, the end of the lock-up period is an import point in time in that we often observe a dra
matic change in stock price performance. Nowak and Gropp (2002) also fmd empirical evi
dence for this notion by observing negative abnormal returns when the lock-up period expires.
However, Bessler and Kurth (2005) find that the negative returns are more related to capital
gains taxation (tax lock-up period) than to the regulatory lock up-period. Thus, it is important to
take a closer look over the stock market cycle at the optimal timing of an initial public offering
and the exit fi:om the venture.
III.

Optimal IPO Timing and Venture Capital Exit Timing
The Neuer Markt offers an ideal opportunity to analyze the behavior of management
and venture capitalist with respect to exit strategies and market timing during the hot issue
market of 1999 and 2000. A very important aspect from both the firm’s perspective as well as
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that of the VC is that usually both have similar objectives, i.e., maximizing their own benefits
with respect to the timing of an IPO and the timing of an exit, respectively. However, the point
in time for an optimal revenue maximizing IPO on the one hand, and for an optimal return
maximizing exit of the VC on the other hand, most likely differs. This is especially the case in a
very volatile stock market, or more precisely, in a market with an extremely large increase and
a sharp decline over a short period of time. On the Neuer Markt, the Nemax index increased
from 2.979 on January 4, 1999, to 8,559 on March 10, 2000, and then declined again to 2,743
on December 29, 2000. This all happened within a period of 24 months. Finally the Nemax
declined as low as 353 in October 2002 ( F i ^ e III).
Such an extremely volatile market is particularly risky for VCs in the regulatory envi
ronment of the German Stock Exchange where shareholders on the Neuer Markt were faced
with a mandatory non-negotiable lock-up period of at least six months. Thus, the best possible
time for an IPO and the optimal time for a VC exit may be six months apart. Because another
special regulation of the German Stock Exchange forced the firms to issue new equity at the
time of the IPO (Bessler et al., 2003; Bessler and Kurth, 2004), the offer price really mattered
in that firms clearly tried to issue new securities at the highest possible stock market level. Ob
viously, the general VC objective is also to exit the venture around the highest stock market
level. Thus, the first window of opportunity for the VC to exit the IPO was usually six months
after the initial public offering. Consequently, this regulatory requirement may add to the po
tential conflicts of interest between management and the VC due to the fact that stock market
levels do not stay constant for very long. As a matter of fact, the difference in stock prices after
6 moiiths can be quite severe as is easily observed in Figure III.
IV.

Data and Methodology
In the following sections we first describe our sample data and then the methodology
employed in our empirical analysis.

A.
Data
The sample for our empirical analysis includes 251 firms that went public at the Neuer
Markt during the hot-issue market between January 1999 and December 2000. From this group
of 251 IPOs, 86 firms received venture capital financing before the IPO. All this information is
taken from the IPO prospectus. The main characteristics of all 251 IPOs (of the 86 venturebacked as well as the 165 non venture-backed) are presented in Table II. A comparison reveals
that the venture-backed IPOs are on average significantly smaller than the non venture-backed
IPOs.
Moreover, there are significant differences between venture-backed and non venturebacked IPOs with respect to various ownership structure characteristics. With regard to the is
suing size and valuation of primary and secondary shares the owners in venture-backed IPOs
sell more shares (2 2 .0 1 %) at the time of the initial public offering than the owners in non ven
ture-backed IPOs (16.12%). The participation ratio, which is the number of secondary shares
sold at the IPO date relative to the number of pre IPO shares, is 10.98% and 6.89%, respec
tively. In addition, venture-backed IPOs issue more primary shares than non venture-backed
IPOs. Thus, the dilution factor (primary shares / number of shares pre IPO) is 37.15% relative
to 33.47%. At a first glance, these differences do not appear to be that substantial, but they are
all statistically significant, indicating some important differences between these two groups of
IPOs. In the empirical part venture-backed IPOs are defined by a venture capital stake of at
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least 4% before the IPO. As documented in Table III, the VC equity stake is on average 29.34%
with a minimum of 4.38% and a maximum of 89.80%. The percentage of shares sold at the
time of the IPO is between -49.74% and 100%, meaning that some VCs increased their holding
and some sold all shares immediately. Due to the initial public offerings, the average VC stake
decreases to 16.77% in the secondary market. Thus, about 25% of the shares are sold at the
time of the IPO.
B.
Methodology
Initial returns (underpricing) of the IPO are calculated by relating the first price in the
secondary market to the issuing price. The long-run performance is measured by holding period
returns (BHR) which are calculated for a single stock i for time period T as follows:
BHR

-1

=

(1)

where Ri,t is the return of stock i at time t, and T is the time period for which the BHR is deter
mined. For an equally-weighted portfolio of stocks the return is calculated as:

(2)
■‘V

where dBHRpj is the average BHR of the portfolio, N is the number of stocks in the portfolio,
and T is the time period for which the BHR is calculated. To calculate “Buy-and-HoldAbnormal-Retums” (“BHAR”) the return of the benchmark is subtracted from the IPO return.
1 ^
BHAR = — y
N t;

(3)
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\
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The advantage of this method is that the terminal values of the two strategies, i.e., in
vesting in an IPO or investing in the benchmark, are directly comparable. The “NEMAX All
share” index is used as the benchmark. This market weighted performance index includes all
companies that are listed at the Neuer Markt.
We test for the statistical significance of our empirical findings with various method
ologies. Because abnormal returns are highly skewed both parametric and non-parametric tests
are employed. To analyze whether the mean BHAR is significantly different from zero we em
ploy a skewness-adjusted t-test as documented in Lyon et al. (1999). Furthermore, we compare
the BHAR of the two sub-samples. To test whether the abnormal returns of the two groups dif
fer significantly, a parametric t-test for the differences in means is employed.
We also investigate the impact of venture capital on IPO underpricing and on long-run
performance (BHAR) for 6 months and 36 months by employing cross-sectional OLS regres
sions with White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The independent variables
include the control variables firm size and market-to-book ratio. Firm size corresponds with the
market value of equity. These two variables adjust the IPO performance for the well known
impact of size and growth potential (Lyon et a l, 1999; Gompers and Lemer, 1999b). The firm
size and market-to-book ratio are based on the first market price of the IPO.
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V-

Empirical Results
The empirical results for underpricing and long-run performance of IPOs in the Neuer
Markt are presented in this section. First we examine whether there are significant differences
between venture-backed and non venture-backed IPOs (A). We then analyze whether there are
differences with respect to other characteristics such as the exit behavior at the time of the IPO
(B) as well as the impact of the lock-up commitment (C). In addition, we test for the robustness
of our results with some cross sectional regressions (D). Finally, we investigate the exit deci
sion of venture capitalists as well as the long-run performance of IPOs by employing raw re
turns instead of abnormal returns (E). By analyzing raw returns we follow the approach by
Lowry (2003) who investigated the return behavior of initial public offerings in the U.S. in hot
and cold issue markets. She does not find any differences in return behavior between hot and
cold issue markets, but documents inferior raw returns for IPOs which initially listed in a hot
issue market.
A.
Results for Venture-Backed and Non Venture-Backed IPOs
As discussed in the literature review there is the testable hypothesis that venture capital
ists, due to their special screening, monitoring, and consulting abilities, should have a positive
impact on firm quality and IPO performance. Thus, we first analyze the returns of the 8 6 venture-backed and the 165 non venture-backed IPOs with respect to initial returns (underpricing)
and long-run performance. The results are presented in Figure IV and Table IV. Both sub
samples reveal a significant underpricing of 54.48% for venture-backed and 42.68% for non
venture-backed IPOs. Moreover, the abnormal returns (BHAR) after 6 months of trading are
positive with significant returns of 31.92% and 22.46%, respectively. Interestingly, after 36
months of trading (750 trading days) the performance of the IPOs in both sub-samples is nearly
identical with 0.54% and 2.87%, respectively. These results suggest that, on average, the initial
shareholders (owners) have much better exit opportunities after 6 months than either at the time
of the IPO or later on. It is important to note that the difference in initial returns (underpricing)
and returns after 6 and 36 months for the venture-backed and non venture-backed IPOs is not
statistically significant, meaning that our conclusions in general apply to both groups of IPOs.
It is also evident from Figure IV that there is hardly any difference between these two groups of
IPOs. We therefore have to conclude from our empirical analysis that VC involvement does not
appear to have a significant impact on IPO underpricing (initial returns) and on IPO long-run
performance.
Our findings are to some extent in contrast to the empirical literature. One possible ex
planation for this is that German venture capitalists, given the dramatic increase in VC fimds
during the 1990s, did not have the experience, the ability or the time period needed to have a
significant impact in order to outperform non venture-backed IPOs. It has to be added that es
pecially IPOs in the year 2000 did not have the operating and financial performance yet for a
successful listing. The great opportunity that an extremely high stock price level offered con
vinced many CEOs to go public sooner than later even when this was up to several years before
the firm were realistically ready for an exchange listing. Thus, this very special market envi
ronment may not be the most adequate setting to make a verdict on the quality and contribution
of venture capitalists.
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B.
Venture Capital and Exit in the Primary Market
The venture capitalist usually has the choice to sell the shares either in the primary or
secondary market. Given the assumed private information advantage of the VC, an immediate
exit at the time of the IPO could be interpreted by the market as a signal of expected inferior
performance for the foreseeable future. In contrast, a commitment by the venture capitalist to
keep the equity stake for some time after going public should usually be interpreted as a posi
tive signal about expected long-run returns. In fact, it has to be assumed that the venture capi
talist who stays invested in the stock is hoping for a superior exit opportunity later on. In order
to analyze the exit behavior in more detail we separate the 86 venture-backed IPOs into two
sub-samples. The first group includes 43 IPOs in which the VCs sold a relatively higher per
centage of their shares at the time of the IPO (High VC Exit). The other group includes the re
maining 43 IPOs in which the VCs sold a relatively low percentage of the equity stake in the
primary market (Low VC Exit). The empirical results are presented in Figure V and Table V.
They reveal that the group with the higher exit behavior at the time of the IPO has, as expected,
a higher underpricing of 65.16% compared to 43.80%. Thus, the market seems to be aware of
potential agency problems. After the first 6 months of trading this group has not only a rela
tively low and insignificant performance of only 11.18% but also a significantly inferior per
formance relative to the other group (52.66%). Thus, for the second group with the higher
commitment at the time of the IPO we first find a lower and significant initial return (underpricing) of 43.80% and then a higher and significant overperformance over the first six months
of trading of 52.66%. Interestingly, immediately after the end of the lock-up period we observe
a sharp decline in relative performance so that the two groups started to be hardly distinguish
able after 12 months of trading. After 36 months the retums are not significantly different from
zero (-3.02% and 4.10%) and there is no significant difference in BHAR between these two
groups. The difference in the relative performance of the two groups becomes very obvious in
Figure V. It appears that the IPOs in which venture capitalists had sold their shares at the time
of the IPO do not have a price increase at all. In contrast, the VC group that does not exit at the
time of the IPO has an excellent relative performance for the first six months of trading. The
highest abnormal retums (BHAR) are reached around the end of the lock-up period. Subse
quently the retums start to decline sharply. A look at the performance chart clearly indicates
that an exit immediately after the end of the lock-up period was an exceptional time to sell the
shares. Thus, the VCs had either a great ability to forecast retum patterns very precisely or they
or someone else had the opportunity to positively influence stock prices in the secondary mar
ket. Bessler and Kurth (2005) find for a larger sample of IPOs empirical evidence that buy rec
ommendations by analysts that provided venture capital financing to the IPO have a positive
impact on the performance over the first 6 months of trading. Thus, the German universal bank
ing system may have some inherent agency problems that are exploited to the disadvantage of
the small investor. In any case, such a price behavior offers the venture capitalist an ideal exit
environment at the end of the lock-up period. Whether the lock-up period in general has some
impact on underpricing and performance is investigated in the next section.
C.
Venture Capital and Lock-up Commitment
The rules and regulation with respect to the lock-up period on the Neuer Markt in Ger
many are unique in that a minimum period of six months is mandatory and non-negotiable,
whereas in other countries it is usually based on a contract between the firm and the under
writer that can take various forms (Bessler et al., 2003). In our sample in 22 out of 84 venture-
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backed IPOs the VCs made a commitment to extend the required lock-up period for a maxi
mum of 12 months. Two IPOs had to be dropped because all shares were already sold in the
primary market. Because of the extended lock-up periods we also analyze BHAR after 12
months in this section and omit the 36 months in the table. An extension that is voluntary
should signal the confidence of the venture capitalist in the future performance of the IPO.
Thus, we would expect a lower underpricing and a superior long-run performance for these
firms due to the VCs involvement. Nevertheless, an extended lock-up period could also be de
manded by the underwriter in order to place the shares successfully in the market and therefore
may signal adverse selection problems (Goergen et al., 2004).
The empirical findings are presented in Figure VI and Table VI. A comparison of the
results for both groups reveals that the initial return of 52.58% of the 22 IPOs with extended
lock-up periods is almost the same as the significant initial returns of 51.24% of the IPOs with
the standard 6 months lock-up period. However, after 6 months of trading the stocks with the 6
months lock-up period have significant BHAR of 37.02% compared to 22.08% for the other
group. After 12 months of trading the return pattern has reversed in that the group with the 12
months lock-up period now has BHAR of 34.46% compared to 17.43%. After 36 months the
returns for both groups are quite similar with insignificant BHAR of 0.65% and 2.43%.
The retum pattern in Figure VI seems to indicate that the group with the 6 months lock
up period was fortunate to have the performance peak close to the end of this period, whereas
the abnormal returns of the other group started to increase later on and reaching a peak some
time later. There seems to be a parallel shift into the future of about three months. Interestingly,
the BHAR at the end of each lock-up period are very similar with 37.02% (6 months) for the
first group and 34.46% (12 months) for the other group. However, the 6 months result is sig
nificant whereas the 12 months result is insignificant. Overall, the results suggest that the ex
tended lock-up periods of the venture capitalist are not a credible signal for superior long-run
performance. Thus, we have to conclude that the empirical evidence does not suggest that an
extended lock-up period indicates higher firm quality and therefore superior IPO performance.
D.
Cross Sectional Regressions
In this section we extend our analysis by including additional variables and testing for
the robustness of our empirical findings in the previous sections with several cross sectional
regressions. The results are presented in Table VII. The dependent variables are IPO underpric
ing or initial returns (Model 1) and BHAR after 6 months and 12 months of trading (Models 2
and 3, respectively). All models now include the control variables market value of equity (In
Market Capital) and market-to-book ratio (In Market/Book). The variables “Dummy VC”,
“Dummy VC is Underwriter”, and “Dummy 2000” are dummy variables equal to 1 if the IPO is
venture-backed, if the VC is underwriter, or if the IPO listed in the year 2000, respectively. The
variable “A VC” denotes the change in the number of stocks at the IPO date and “VC Lock-up”
the length of the lock-up period in months. In addition we analyze the impact of the dilution
factor and the participation ratio.
In accordance with our findings based on abnormal returns (BHAR) in section A, the
regression results indicate that the coefficient for the VC dummy variable is not significant in
any model (Models la, 2a, and 3a). Obviously, our previous observation that VC ownership
does not have any significant impact on IPOs underpricing and performance is confirmed.
However, within the group of venture-backed IPOs the magnitude of the ownership has a sig
nificantly positive impact on IPO performance (Models lb, 2b, and 3b). The higher the per
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centage of VC ownership, the lower is the IPO underpricing and the higher is the long-run per
formance. Furthermore, we observe higher initial returns if the VC is a member of the under
writer syndicate, indicating conflicts of interests when providing both services. This result is
confirmed in a study by Bessler and Kurth (2005) who employ a larger sample and test for
these issues in greater detail. The dummy variable ”VC is underwriter” is a measure for the fact
that the venture capitalist belongs to the underwriter institution. It has a significantly positive
effect on underpricing for venture-backed IPOs (Model lb). The empirical evidence supports
the notion that investors are aware of these conflicts of interest and demand higher initial re
turns when the venture capitalist is part of the underwriter consortium. In addition, the dilution
factor has a significant impact on underpricing in that a larger number of shares that are issued
at the time of the IPO results in a higher underpricing. Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) argue that
a high dilution factor in conjunction with high initial returns represents high opportunity costs
for the IPO in the form of “money left on the table”. In contrast, the participation ratio is sig
nificant only after 6 months of trading, indicating that shareholders that do exit in the primary
market are not successfLil in reducing IPO underpricing as argued by Habib and Ljungqvist
(2001). However, they are faced with quite promising exit conditions after the expiration of the
lock-up period. Overall, we do not find empirical evidence that the performance of venturebacked IPOs differs significantly from that of non venture-backed IPOs.
The results of the cross sectional regressions clearly reveal that the BHAR after 6
months of trading are higher when the venture capitalist keeps the shares, i.e., sells less shares
at the time of the IPO (Model 2b). Interestingly, the variable ”A VC ownership“ that measures
the change in VC ownership is still significant after 36 months of trading (Model 3b). Thus,
there is some evidence for a medium term and long term effect. Moreover, the results suggest
that the VC is able to time the exit in the secondary market quite well. In contrast, we do not
find any significant impact of the lock-up factor in the cross sectional regressions. Thus, as
documented in section B, VCs are not able to signal the quality of the IPO by committing to an
extended lock-up period. In sum, the empirical findings based on abnormal returns (BHAR) are
basically confirmed by our cross sectional regression analysis. An analysis of raw returns or
buy-and-hold-retums (BHR) should add further insights into the performance of venture backed
IPOs especially with respect to exit strategies. We analyze BHR in the next section.
E.

Venture Capital and Exit Behavior in the Secondary Market; An
Analysis of Raw Returns
Our results in the previous sections reveal that VC exit behavior is to some extend re
lated to the abnormal performance of the venture-backed IPOs. Therefore, we complement our
study in this section with an additional analysis of raw returns. The basic idea is that VCs can
achieve extraordinarily high returns by exiting in hot issue markets, but realize low (or nega
tive) returns if the stock market declines. Thus, market valuation and IPO raw returns are criti
cal factors that determine the VC’s optimal exit decision. In declining stock markets, it may be
sensible to sell the equity stake as soon as possible, i.e., in the primary market. In contrast, in a
period of increasing stock prices, VCs should be more patient because they have the choice to
exit in the secondary market any time after the lock-up period expires. In addition, if VCs are
successful in timing the IPO in order to raise additional capital at relatively high prices, the
listing date has to be scheduled at least six months before the reversion in stock prices. How
ever, this applies only to markets with mandatory lock-up periods such as the Neuer Markt. In
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the rest of this section we examine whether VCs succeeded in timing the IPO exit before stock
prices crashed in the first quarter of 2 0 0 0 .
In Figure VII we present the buy-and-hold returns (BHR) of venture-backed and non
venture-backed IPOs. Our empirical analysis so far does not provide any evidence o f major
differences in the stock market performance between each group. The BHR are quite independ
ent of whether the IPO is venture-backed or not. This is also the case when we separate the
sample by the years 1999 and 2000 (results are not reported here). Thus, there is no evidence
that venture capitalists had superior abilities in the market over that period. It appears, however,
that much of the performance is determined by the year of the IPO. We therefore distinguish
between IPOs issued in the years 1999 and 2000. As is documented in Figure VIII there were
profitable exit opportunities for VCs and other initial investors for those firms that went public
in 1999. Obviously, these investors should have avoided the cost of underpricing of about 45%
on average and should have sold their shares later on in the secondary market. In 2000, exit
conditions changed dramatically. The BHR of IPOs is negative. They start to decline immedi
ately from the very beginning of trading. Despite an underpricing of about 49% in 2000, some
investors were much better off by selling their shares in the primary market instead of commit
ting to a lock-up period of six months. Thus, VCs had excellent exit conditions in the stock
market if the IPO initially listed before the third quarter in 1999 but had a difficult environment
for the IPOs of 2000. This clearly indicates that VCs can profit nicely firom IPOs in hot issue
markets as long as the lock-up period expires before the stock market reverts. For IPOs initially
listed in 2000 the VCs hardly had any opportunity to exit profitably in the secondary market
due to lock-up periods. Staying invested may still be the only sensible option.
Until 2002 there was no data available about individual VC exit behavior in the secon
dary market. Due to some institutional changes in disclosure requirements in Germany, we now
do have reliable information available about venture-backed IPO ownership structure after
about three years of trading. We employ this data for an analysis of VC exit behavior in the
secondary market. As reported in Table III, VC’s mean (median) IPO ownership amounts to
4.22% (0.0%). This is strongly reflected in VCs exit behavior in the stock market. In 26 of 84
cases (31%), the VC still owned shares of the IPO even after about three years of trading. Thus,
in 58 cases (69%) we do not observe any VC ownership and conclude that the VC must have
exited sometime between lock-up expiration and the observation date of about 36 months after
the IPO. Interestingly, these 26 IPOs are firms that went public in the year 2000 (17 IPOs,
65%). Only 9 IPOs initially were listed in 1999 (35%). Thus, considering only the IPOs of the
year 1999, VCs exited within three years in about 80% of IPOs. For the venture-backed IPOs of
2000 this is only true for about 60% of our observations. Thus, the probability of a VC invest
ment of venture-backed IPOs is about 20% for IPOs of 1999 and 40% for IPOs of 2000. In a
logit regression not documented here we find strong evidence that the probability of VC in
vestment after three years is indeed strongly influenced by the year of going public.
These observations are not surprising. For the venture-backed IPOs of 2000, the IPO
happened too late in the stock market cycle so that the lock-up period had expired after the
stock market crash in March 2000. Thus, VCs did not have the opportunity to exit successfully.
In retrospect, many VCs should have sold all of their shares immediately after the lock-up expi
ration despite the declining stock prices. This is due to the fact that stock prices declined much
ftirther and did not recover until now. Thus, in 2000 those VCs that are still invested in the IPO
after three years presumably expected just a temporary decline in stock prices and not a sus
tained decline in technology stocks. This behavior is not that surprising given the optimistic
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environment at that time. Even the decrease of the Nemax index from 8,500 to 5,500 from
March to June 2000 kept some market participants extremely optimistic. For example, DG
Bank, one of the most active underwriters in Neuer Markt IPOs, forecasted in August 2000 that
an increase of the Nemax back to 8,500 would occur by the end of that year. They also ex
pected an even further advance to 12,000 by the end of 2001 (DG Bank, 2000). Unfortimately,
the index was down to 1,100 at that time. Thus, it appears that not all venture capitalists were
successful in perfectly timing their IPO exit.
VI.

Summary and Conclusions
Hot issue markets, i.e., periods with very favorable stock market valuations, usually
provide an ideal setting for firms to go public and for a venture capitalist to exit profitably from
the venture. In general, the VC can either exit in the primary market at the time of the IPO or
later in the secondary market. In addition, a combination of both strategies is possible. Regula
tion of the German Stock Exchange for the Neuer Markt required that initial shareholders had
to commit to a mandatory lock-up period of at least six months. If stock prices fluctuated sub
stantially within the first six months of trading these shareholders were constrained to respond
to significant price decreases and sell their shares immediately in the market. Thus, in the case
of a mandatory lock-up period with high uncertainty about future stock price movements it may
be sensible to even forego the usually large initial returns and to exit without delay in the pri
mary market. However, if VCs have access to private information about firm performance, then
they may be able to forecast future stock prices and time their exit successfully either in the
primary or secondary markets. Whether VCs usually have certain abilities in predicting future
stock prices, however, is doubtful indeed. Thus, a decision to exit or not at the time of the IPO
involves quite some speculation about the IPO and stock market performance over the next six
months.
In this study we examined underpricing (initial retums) and long-run performance of
firms that went public in the Neuer Markt in 1999 and 2000. In this market segment, the time
window of opportunity for a very lucrative going public and a profitable exit lasted only for
several months. Although we apply different methodologies in our empirical analysis we do not
find significant differences in the performance between venture-backed and non venturebacked IPOs. However, we do have some indications of excellent exit timing within the group
of venture-backed IPOs. We first examine VC’s exit decision at the IPO date and find strong
evidence that VCs indeed timed their exit successfully. Thus, VC’s exit behavior is a strong
predictor of IPO abnormal performance in particular in the first six months of trading. The lar
ger the number of shares that the VCs sell at the time of the IPO, the lower is the IPO perform
ance after the expiration of the lock-up period. Second, the length of the lock-up period to
which the VCs commit has no significant impact on the IPO performance. Thus, it is not clear
at all whether voluntary extended lock-up periods signal higher IPO quality.
Finally, we investigate whether VC ownership after three years of trading is determined
by general stock market conditions. From the initial shareholder and especially the venture
capitalist perspective, it appears that those IPOs that were listed in 1999 had good opportunities
to exit. In contrast, IPOs of the year 2000 did not have any opportunity for a profitable exit. For
firms that went public in 1999, the VCs usually sold their shares within the first three years,
most likely within the first year in the secondary market. For venture-backed IPOs that listed in
2000, it appears that many VCs did not exit at the time of the IPO and were surprised by the
stock market crash in March 2000. There is some empirical evidence that they were prevented
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from an optimal exit due to the mandatory lock-up period and are still invested in the IPO three
years after the initial public offering. Obviously, from the perspective of the venture capitalist,
the IPOs of the year 2000 decided to go public too late in the stock market cycle, although this
was an optimal time for selling shares and raising additional equity. Consequently, lock-up
commitments are costly agreements or signaling devices towards the end of a hot new issue
market.
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Figure I

Total Portfolio Volume Held by Members of the BVK (in € Billion)

For the years 2001, 2002, and 2003 VC volume includes investments by pan-European
funds o f € 6.6, € 2.0 and € 5.1 billion, respectively.
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Table la

New Funds Raised of VC in Germany (in Million €)

Year

Volume

Banks

Insurance

Pension Funds

Public Sector

1997

2186

58.0%

10.0%

12.0%

5.0%

1998

1594

50.0%

14.0%

14.0%

4.0%

1999

4310

29.0%

10.0%

30.0%

12.0%

2000

5803

29.0%

17.0%

12.0%

16.0%

Source: BVK (2004).

Table Ib

VC Exit-Routes in Germany

Year

Volume

Trade Sale

Buy Back

IPO

Secondary
Purchase

W rite-off

1997

728

34.1%

21.6%

2.7%

4.4%

15.0%

1998

537

22.5%

30.0%

14.0%

0.0%

17.0%

1999

769

25.1%

20.7%

12.6%

4.0%

21%

2000

1262

39.0%

17.1%

9.2%

7.4%

18.4%

2001

1855

20.4%

18.0%

0.4%

7.9%

36.3%

2002

2132

30.6%

3.7%

0.0%

11.7%

44.1%

2003

820

17.8%

9.9%

1.1%

14.0%

40.2%

Source: BVK (2004).

38
Figure II

Number of IPOs in Germany

Source: DAI, own calculations.
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Figure III

Number of IPOs per Month and Neuer Markt Index (Nemax)
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Table II

IPO Characteristics

VB IPOs and NVB IPOs are venture-backed and non venture-backed IPOs, respec
tively. M edian values are shown in squared brackets. Issues size contains the greenshoe
option if exercised. This option allows the underwriter to buy additional shares from the
All IPOs
(251)

VB IPOs (86)

Mean

Mean
[Median]

NVB IPOs
(165)

[Median]

M ean
[Median

t-Test
(Difference
in Means)

A. Size and V aluation
Issue Size [Mio.
€1J
L
Market Value Primary
Market [Mio. €]
M arket Value Secon
dary Market [Mio. €]

81.42

52.04

96.74

[43.55]

[40.28]

[44.00]

369.36

158.72

479.15

[133.30]

[112.46]

[154.65]

487.78

248.26

612.62

[200.03]

[155.13]

[209.06]

-2.27**

-1.88*

-11 98**
O

B. P rim ary and Secondary Shares
Secondary Shares/ Is
sued Shares [%]
Participation Ratio [%‘

Dilution Factor [Vo

18.14

22.01

16.12

[14.82]

[21.20]

[13.04]

8.29

10.98

6.89

[6.23]

[9.00]

[4.98]

34.73

37.15

33.47

[33.33]

[33.95]

[33.11]

9 QO***
^O
3 4^7***

2.01**

issuing firm at the issue price. The market values in the primary and secondary market
are based on IPO issue prices and first stock market prices, respectively. The participa
tion ratio is the ratio o f secondary shares sold to the number o f shares pre IPO. The dilu
tion factor is the ratio o f primary shares newly issued to the number o f shares pre IPO.
***,**, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
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Table III

VC Ownership

VC ownership post IPO represents the information just after the IPO.

N

Mean

Median

STD

Min.

Max.

Pre IPO (%)

86

29.34

24.40

20.25

4.38

89.80

Post IPO (%)

86

16.46

13.34

12.92

0.00

71.30

% Shares Sold

86

26.12

22.36

25.11

-49.74

100.00

Lock-up (Month)

84

7.50

6.00

2.57

6.00

12.00

Ownership after 3 years
(%)

84

4.22

0.00

9.78

0.00

76.49
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Figure IV

BHAR for Venture-Backed and Non Venture-Backed IPOs for the First 3 Years

The returns are mean BHAR with the Nemax index as benchmark for the first 750 trad-

40%
^ V e n tu re -B a c k e d IPOs (N=86)
Non Venture-Backed IPOs (N=165)

151
Lock-up

201

251

301

351

401

451

501

551

651

701

Trading Days

ing days. The vertical line represents the end o f the lock-up period o f six months.
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Table IV

Underpricing and BHARs for Venture-Backed and Non Venture-Backed IPOs

VB IPOs and NVB IPOs are venture-backed and non venture-backed IPOs, respec
tively. N denotes the sample size, STD the standard deviation, T (adj.) and T (Means)
the t-values from a skewness-adjusted t-test and a t-test for differences o f means,
respectively.
and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
N

Mean

Median

STD

T (adj.)

T
(Means)

U nderpricing
VB-IPO

86

54.48

21.48

77.19

9.56***

NVB-IPO

165

42.68

14.29

70.03

11 70***

1.19

BH A R 123
VB-IPO

86

31.92

-10.16

112.80

3.27***

NVB-IPO

165

22.46

-6.20

108.94

3.15***

-4.46

26.52

0.19

-4.33

33.92

1.22

0.64

BH A R 750
VB-IPO
NVB-IPO

86
165

0.54
2.87

-0.60
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Figure V

VC Exit at Time of IPO (Primary Market)

The returns are mean BHAR with the Nemax index as benchmark for the first 750 trad
ing days. The vertical line represents the end o f the lock-up period o f six months.
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Table V

VC Exit at Time of IPO (Primary M arket)

The venture-backed IPOs are separated in two sub-samples by the median value of
shares sold at the IPO date. N denotes the sample size, STD the standard deviation, T
(adj.) and T (Means) the t values from a skewness-adjusted t-test and a t-test for differ
ences in means, respectively. ***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels,
respectively.
N

Mean

Median

STD

T (adj.)

T
(Means)

U nderpricing
High VC Exit

43

65.16

29.41

82.94

7 54***

Low VC Exit

43

43.80

9.80

70.34

6.08***

1.29

BH A R 123
High VC Exit

43

11.18

-14.60

75.66

1.05

Low VC Exit

43

52.66

6.83

138.36

2 39***

-1.72*

BHAR 750
High VC Exit

43

-3.02

-4.47

22.97

0.99

Low VC Exit

43

4.10

-4.03

29.50

1.01

-1.25
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Figure VI

VC Lock-up Commitment

The returns are mean BHAR with the Nemax index as benchmark for the first 750 trad60%
6 Months

12 Months

— VC Lock-up > 6 M (N=22)
VC Lock-up = 6 M (N=62)

-- 1--------1------- -------- 1--------r
51

- 10%

101

151

201

251

Lock-up Periods

301

351

401

451

501

Trading Days

ing days. The vertical lines represent the end o f the lock-up periods.

651

701
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Table VI

VC Lock-up Commitment

The venture-backed IPOs are separated in two sub-samples by the length o f lock-up
commitment. N denotes the sample size, STD the standard deviation, T (adj.) and T
(Means) the t values generated by a skewness-adjusted t-test and a t-test for differences
in means, respectively. ***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respec
tively.
N

Mean

Median

STD

T (adj.)

T
(Means)

U nderpricing
Lock-up = 6 M

62

52.58

21.48

77.67

7 95***

Lock-up > 6 M

22

5L24

10.63

68.15

4.80***

Lock-up = 6 M

62

BHAR 123
37.02
-11.80

126.30

2,86***

Lock-up > 6 M

22

22.08

3.78

68.76

1.79*

Lock-up = 6 M

62

BHAR 250
17.43
-6.20

131.81

1.14

Lock-up = 12
M

20

34.46

-5.18

120.45

1.67

0.08

0.69

-0.54
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Table VII

Cross Sectional Regressions

The table on the following page reports OLS regression results with W hite’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The dependent variables are IPO initial returns
(model 1) and BHAR after 6 months and 12 months o f trading (models 2 and 3). All
models include the control variables market value o f equity (In M arket Cap.) and market-to-book ratio (In Market/Book). The variables Dummy VC, Dummy VC is Under
writer, and Dummy 2000 are dummy variables equal to 1 if the IPO is venture-backed,
if the VC is underwriter, and if the IPO listed in 2000, respectively. A VC denotes the
change in the number o f stocks at the IPO date and VC Lock-up the length o f lock-up
period in months. The dilution factor is the ratio o f primary shares newly issued and the
number o f shares pre IPO. The participation ratio is the ratio o f secondary shares sold
and the number o f shares pre IPO. a, b, and c are 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels,
respectively.
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Underpricing

Intercept
In Market Cap.
In Market/Book
Dummy VC

BHAR 6 Months

BHAR 36 Months

Model la

Model lb

Model 2a

Model 2b

Model 3a

Model 3b

-3.26

-2.45

-1.53

-5.76

-0.27

1.34

[-5.39"]

[-2.38^]

[-1.09]

[-1.49]

[-0.50]

[1.67]

0.06

0.01

0.15

0.44

0.04

-0.06

[1.70^

[0.22]

[2.04*^]

[1.98^]

[1.31]

[-1.45]

1.22

1.24

-0.48

-0.94

-0.22

-0.13

[9.49T

[6.20"]

[-2.29*’]

[-3.41"]

[-4.91"]

[-2.25*’]

0.01

0.22

-0.00

[0.18]

[1.42]

[-0.4]

VC Ownership
pre IPO

-3.73*10-'

-0.01

3.78*10'"

[-1.80^

[-0.95]

[1.93T

A VC Owner
ship

0.34

1.67

0.16

[1.51]

[2.19^]

[1.90T

0.00

0.04

-0.01

[0.18]

[1.17]

[-0.54]

0.19

0.27

0.04

[2.08‘^]

[0.97]

[0.58]

VC Lock-up
Dummy VC is
Underwriter
Dummy 2000

Dilution
Participation

-0.03

-0.11

-0.42

-0.84

0.02

0.08

[-0.53]

[-1.10]

[-2.81"]

[-3.08"]

[0.36]

[1.54]

2.09

2.30

-0.22

-0.50

-0.11

-0.00

[7.54"]

[4.83"]

[-0.34]

[-0.45]

[-0.54]

[-0.00]

-0.11

-1.32

-0.05

[-0.36]

[-1.87T

[-0.20]

Adjusted

0.59

0.68

0.04

0.23

0.06

0.19

# Observations

251

84

251

84

251

84
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Figure VII

Raw Returns (BHR) of Venture-Backed and Non Venture-Backed IPOs

The returns are mean BHR for the first 750 trading days. The vertical line represents the
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Figure VIII

Raw Returns (BHR) and the Year of Issuance

The returns are mean BHR for the first 750 trading days. The vertical line represents the

